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The use o:f the probable in decision-making v1as analyzed by the 
skeptic, Carneades, in the· second century B. c. His 110rk involved the 
use of a Greek 1~ord for probable and a meaning for probable different 
from those discussed by Sambursky (1956) in his study of the probable 
in ancient Greece. 
1. Two Greek concepts of probability 
Probability in the scientific community is a tool :for handling measurement 
errors, individual differences, and lack of precision in for;..ulas and models. 
Probability provides a measure for these sources of variability. When the vari-
ability is tal~en into account, the probable is that >vhich is likely. 
Probability in the business community is a tool for handling incomplete 
information in decision-making. Information is used to arrive at a degree of 
belief, a ~)robab ili ty or an expectation, which is of sufficient magnitude to allov; 
choice. After this treatment of all available information, the probable is that 
1·1hich is preferred. 
Though the mathematics of these tHo concepts of probability may often be the 
same, philosophically they have feH points in comm.on. The former is a notion of 
the probable which attempts objectivity, offering no value judgments and proposing 
no future plan of action. The development in ancient Greece of this concept, 
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€ ~;i.e a, has been studied by Sambursky (1956) 1 . It developed primarily among the 
Stoics . in an environment of strict determinism. The latter ·:.s a notion of the 
probable necessarily subjective, using subjective judgments about what is appro-
priate information to arrive at the value judgments and proposed plans of action 
which are excluded from the notion €t;i.6a. In ancient Greece the development of 
this concept of the probable, n~eavoa, is to be found in the work of the skeptics 
of the Third Academy. This is a completely subjective environment, allowing that 
man is incapable of knmrledge, only capable of belief. 
' " -Both Greek ·words, €vXoa and nl.eavoa, are translated as probable, but the 
' , synonyms for probable form distinct groups. €~Xoa may be translated as likely, 
reasonable, just, fit, or proper. nl.eavoa may be translated as persuasive, 
attractive, pleasing, or acceptable (Pickering (1846))2 • While the adjectives 
likely, reasonable, just, fit, and proper imply something universal and objective 
about their subject; persuasive, attractive, pleasing, and acceptable imply a 
subjective judgment by some individual or group about their subject. 
An example may demonstrate the distinction being made. Hhen the v1eather 
report indicates a forty percent chance of rain, if this can be accepted as an 
' " objective judgment, it is probable in the €uXoa sense that it will not rain. But 
in the nt~eavo a sense it is probable that it will rain because I am convinced that 
it is expedient to carry an umbrella. I am persuaded to act as if it were going 
' .. to rain. Thus, while € ~x.o a is closely related to modern conceptions about proba-
bility, nt.eavoa may be closer to the Bayesian concept of expected loss. 
2. Carneades, the skeptic 
Carneades was the most accomplished speaker in Greece in the second century 
before Christ. He Has unsurpassed in argument, able to convince people of one 
viewpoint one day and the opposing viewpoint the following day. While in Rome to 
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defend the Greek schools and the study of philosophy, Carneades convinced the 
Romans that they acted with justice and returned the following day to demolish 
all arguments for an objective justice. 3 The only philosophy for this academic 
philosopher, the head of Plato's Academy and "unquestionably the greatest philoso-
pher in Greece in the four centuries from Chrysippus to Plctinus\, was a thorough-
going skepticism. If rebuttal is possible fer any argument, no argument can be 
known to be true. Carneades spent his life arguing against all forms of dogmatism, 
especially the Stoic "truths". When the Stoics attacked his skepticism he carried 
it to its limit, even denying anything stronger than belief in the truth of the 
premises of his skepticism. 
A major difficulty inherent in skepticism >-Jas the problem of rational action. 
By postulating complete knowledge, complete information, the dogmatic philosophers 
of his age found constructive bases fer laws of conduct. The skeptic, 1<lithholding 
any judgment of truth, has no alternative but to refrain from action or propose 
rules fer action in the face of uncertainty. Aristotle is credited with consider-
ing probability as the basis fer judicial judgment. 5 The skeptic made probability 
crucial in all decisions by denying any possibility of certainty. Arcesilaus of 
Pitane (315-240 B. C.) >vas the first academic skeptic to head Plato's Academy. He 
1va.s first to propose probabilities as the basis fer all action. Carneades is the 
focus of attention because he developed the notion of probability, explaining its 
function and its characteristics. His study of probability has been cited in the 
philosophic literature as "the most careful analysis of the phenomenon (of choice) ~~ 6 
3. Carneades' notion of probability 
After arguing that man cannot knm·J anything and must al1vays suspend final 
judgment, something must be developed to allow man to act dh::pite his unct;rtainty. 
Arcesilaus met the argument that his reasoning forced him to remain perpetually 
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indecisive by stating that even among his critics,· the Stoics, decisions were not 
based on certainties. The probable must always be part of the reasoning ivhich 
leads one to a decision. Arcesilaus proposed probability as the key to decision 
~ing, but nothing is recorded of any efforts to examine its functioning or to 
_systematically study it. Therefore attention is concentrated on Carneades. 
Carneades became leader of the Academy one hundred years after Arcesilaus, 
and -v1as faced with the same arguments from the Stoics as his predecessor. His 
arguments were often further refined and develnped versions of Arcesilaus' argu-
ments. He developed a notion of probability as a basis for Qecision and gave 
examples, showing how to use it and how it differed from the Stoic notions of 
bases for decisions. 
Probability (nuea:vc-r1lcr) has three basic' classes. (A) The probable or the 
, 
plausible (m.ea: v 1'1) is that which, taken by itse.li', gives the impression of truth; 
it cannot be rejected without further study. (B) The probable and undisputed is e 
that which gives the impression of truth andis not contradicted by any related notion. 
This might be called plausible and consistent. (c) The probable, undisputed and 
tested is that which has been examined along with all related notions and found to 
be corroborated. There are gradations ivithin each of these classes, so that it is 
possible to talk about the relative probabilities of events which are at the same 
level in terms of the decision-maker's analysis. In decision making it is necessary 
to choose an appropriate class of probabilities and then act based on the positions 
of events within that class. 
(A) Level one, the plausible 
A man pursued by enemies comes to a ditch and considers its potential as a 
hiding place. It is plausible to him that there are enemies waiting in the ditch 
to ambush him. Rather than stop and consider related notions such as which way 
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the v-lind is blmving and how his pursuers feel about crouching in ditches he turns 
aside, avoiding the ditch. The possible loss incurred as a :cesult of joining his 
enemy in the ditch will be enough to discourage the proposed course of action no 
I • .· 
matter how unlikely the event of an ambush turns out to be. In this situation it 
.>- . 
would be poor advice to suggest thorough exB.mination. The probable is the appro-
priate class of probabilities to consider as a basis for action. 7 
In this example the potential loss is enough to direct the decision process. 
Another example of decision making at this level is Pascal 1 s wager. 
1According to the doctrine of chance, you ought to put yourself to 
the trouble of searching for the truth; for if you die without worshipping 
the True Cause, you are lost. - 11 But'1, say you, 11 if He had wished me to 
worship Him, He would have left me signs of His will. 11 - He has done so; 
but you neglect them. Seek them therefore; it is well 1-10rth it. 's 
If God existed, the loss due to failure to pursue His truth would be eternal dam-
nation. Therefore, Pascal reasoned that with such a potent::i J.l penalty a man should 
conduct himself as if God existed, regardless of his beliefs. 
Plausibility is a basis for action when the loss incurred by inaction is 
great enough. In modern language, the work of level one is the establishment of 
a loss function over all possible (plausible) states of nature and potential 
actions. Losses approaching infinity justify action to avoid such a result. 
(B) Level two, the plausible and undisputed 
If one wishes to decide whether a particular man is Soc.mtes, he does not 
base his decision on the fact that such an event is possible. One must consider 
his customary Qualities - color, size, shape, speech, dress. One wishes to have 
the decision depend on plausibility and consistency. The probable and undisputed 
is the appropriate class of probabilities to consider as basis for action. 9 
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The decision maker considers the relevant information which is already avail-
able to achieve a degree of belief concerning the question of interest. In de-
cision theory terminology, the work of level two is the establishment of a prior 
distribution on the possible states of nature. When conside.'·ation of the loss 
function and the prior distribution is properly decisive, action can be based on 
level two results. 
'(c) Level three, the plausible undisputed and tested 
When there is time, or when the decision is particularly critical no matter 
\·lhich action is chosen, one operates in the probable, undisputed and tested class 
of probabilities. 
••• on seeing a coil of rope in an unlighted room a man jumps over 
it, conceiving it for the moment to be a snake (thus acting based on a 
probability of the first class), but turning back afterwards he inquires 
into the truth, and on finding it motionless he is already inclined to 
think that it is not a snake, but as he reckons, all the same, that 
snakes too are motionless at times when numbed by ·Hinter's frost (our 
seeker of truth has failed to find a strong enough probability against 
the coil being a snake in the second class of probabilities), he prods 
at the coiled mass with a stick, and then, after thus testing the presen-
tation received, he assents to the fact that it is false to suppose that 
the body presented to him is a snake. 10 
The decision maker has considered the danger inherent in snakes, the infor-
mation available, and the results of his test in deciding how to act. The work of 
level three is experimentation. The decision maker finishes with a posterior 
Bayes risk on which to base action. 
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4. Conclusion 
A vivid outline of Bayesian decision theory was developed by Carneades to 
allm1 skeptics to act. There appears to have been no additional development for 
almost tHo thousand years. Only after numerical probability was under investi-
gation did a more thorough analysis of numerically tractable decision problems 
become possible. 
This analysis of the problem of rational decision making emphasizes the 
intuitive appeal of Bayesian analysis. If this three-stage process is the 
rational approach to everyday decisions, one might argue that the rational approach 
to the mathematically tractable problems of science and business must be the 
numerical development of Carneades' system, the Bayesian sys~~em. 
5. A Comment 
Carneades refused to go out to dinner bec,ause his 1vork was too important. 
lfuile eating at home friends occasionally had to move his hands for him because 
he was too lost in thought. Either because of this dedication to thought or be-
cause Carneades was too shrewd a politician, he never put anything in writing. 
The author'has attempted tc use only reputable second- and third-hand information. 
It should be noted that people were still putting words into the mouth of Carneades 
in 1930. T\10 important books in which Carneades serves as the proponent of an up-
dated skepticism are: The Sceptical Biologist by Joseph Needham (1930)11 and The 
Sceptical Chymist: or Chymico-physical Doubts and Paradoxes, touching the Experi-
ments Whereby Vulgar Spagirists Are want to Endeavor to Evince their Salt, Sulphur 
and Mercury to be the True Principles of Things by Robert Boyle (1680). 12 In both 
cases much of his dialogue deals with opinions which are neic.her explicit nor 
implicit in his reported opinions. 
- 8 -
Notes 
1. s. Sambursky (195,6). 'On the possible and probable in Ancient Greece', 
Osiris, 12, 35-48. [Reprinted in Studies in the History of Statistics 
and Probability, Volume II, Kendall and Plackett, eds., Griffin, London, 
1977·] -
2. J. Pickering (1846). A Comprehensive Lexicon of ~ Greek Language. l'lilkins, 
Carter, and Co., Boston. 
3· B. Coostant Martha ( 1905). 'Le Philosophe Ca.rn~ade a Rome', pp. 61-134 in 
Etudes Morales sur L'Antiquite (1905), Libraireie Hachette, Paris. 
-------- ' 
4. R. D. Hicks (1910). ~ and Epicurean. Charles ScrL:ner 's Sons, New York, 
p. 322. 
5. F. Men tre ( 1908). Cournot et la Renais sane e du Probab ilisme au XIXe Siec le, 
' -- - ---Marcel Riviere, Paris. 
6. Alfred Schutz (1970). Reflections'on the Problem of Relevance. Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven and london. 
7· Sextus Empiricus. R. G. Bury translation (1935). Against the Logicians. 
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
Sec. 186 (p. 101). 
8. Blaise Pascal. W. F. Trotter translation (1910). Thou~hts. Harvard Classics, e 
Volume 48, Collier and Son, New York. Section III 10f the Necessity of 
the Wager', Sec. 236. 
9. Sextus Empiricus (1935). Sec. 178 (p. 97). 
10. Ibid. Sec. 187-188 (pp. 101-103). 
11. Joseph Needham ( 1930). The Sceptical Biologist. W l\f Norton and Co., New 
York. 'Prefatory Dialogue'. 
12. Robert Boyle (1680). The Sceptical Chymist: or Chymico-physica.l Doubts and 
Paradoxes, touching-the Experiments WherebY Vulgar Spagirists Are want 
to Endeavor to Evince their Salt, Sulphur and Mercury to be the True--
Principles of Things. Henry Hall, Oxford.- - ----
